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This paper is ostensibly a reading of Bataille’s  Story of the Eye.1 My main
assertion  is  that  the  symbolism  surrounding  Simone’s  cunt  involves  the
construction of an immanent continuity of things, which anticipates Bataille’s later
writing  on  eroticism,  religion,  and  “general  economy”.  These  three  aspects  of
Bataille’s thought intersect in the rite, and spectacle, of sacrifice. In sacrifice, the
victim—be it human or, say, goat—is a useful object that has been taken out of
circulation, that is, out of utility. It is by virtue of this negation of use-value, and of
the economic and epistemological structures that sustain it, that the object escapes
the profane world and accedes to an immanent relation with the sacred. At the same
time,  of course,  the festival  of  sacrifice is necessarily transgressive:  only in the
taboo’s being broken are its boundaries first determined. As Bataille stresses: no
taboo, no eroticism. Hence, sacrifice’s immanence is fatally intertwined with its
transgression: the sacrificial victim embodies not only the god, but the breaking of
god’s decrees.  My argument,  simply put,  is that Simone’s cunt is the sacrificial
circle.
1
 Trans. Joachim Neugroschal, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2001.
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However, as we shall see, this comes at a price. The immanent symbolism
that  characterises Simone’s cunt falls  on the one hand within a larger symbolic
system of infertility and impotence; on the other, it finds itself in conflict within the
epistemic crisis within the text posed by Simone’s interiority. This double-bind, I
shall argue, arises from an overbearing, and undermentioned, influence in Bataille’s
thought. I refer to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
From a genetic point  of  view,  I  am assuming that  the Kantian strains  in
Bataille’s thought come via the Marquis de Sade. The first section of this paper will
start from this premise. As far as I’m aware, Adorno and Horkheimer were the first
to make the connection between the categorical imperative and Sadism; since then,
others, most  notably perhaps Lacan, have followed suit.  In these instances, they
make Kant a Sadist. I, on the other hand, want to make Sade a Kantian. Or rather, I
want  to  point  out  a  quintessentially  Kantian  structure  to  Sade’s  thought  which
Bataille inherits in some respects. The second section turns in more detail to Story
of the Eye, and to the textual operations surrounding Simone’s cunt, that is to say,
the symbolism of infertility,  the textual  immanence.  As I said before,  Simone’s
cunt, in its immanence, promises resolution to a series of epistemological problems
that her interiority sets for the narrator, and for the text more generally. The third
and final  section  of  this  paper  will  look  at  these  problems,  and how they lead
Simone’s cunt to be wrested from her body.
In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gives the example
of the “friend of man”1,  who acts benevolently out of  sheer niceness.  Here,  the
determining  ground  of  the  man’s  actions,  goodwill,  is  a  psychological,  that  is
empirical state. What concerns Kant here is that if the friend of man is not feeling
very friendly one day, there is no way of knowing whether he will act benevolently
or not. If, by contrast, his action is grounded in duty, he will do so irrespective of
mood.  As so often in Kant, it  comes down to a question of synthetic  apriority.
Which is to say that the maxim for the action must be such that it both a priori lead
1
 I.  Kant,  Groundwork  for  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals,  trans.  Allen  W. Wood,  London,  Yale
University Press, 2002, p. 10.
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to  the  action,  and  that  the  action  itself  not  be  entirely  “contained”  within  the
maxim. Just as causality provides the synthetic a priori principle underwriting the
empirical  laws  of  nature,  the  moral  injunction  to  duty  underwrites  the
transcendental laws of freedom. 
This is precisely the same logic as is found in de Sade’s injunction to crime,
a logic which Bataille  describes very well  when he says:  “Crimes committed in
cold blood are greater than crimes carried out in the heat of the moment”.1 For
these crimes are grounded on crime itself, not on contingent feeling—hence again
an a priori link between the determining ground of the maxim and its action. It is
for this that so much Sadean sex becomes drudgery.
But Bataille is not de Sade.  De Sade aims for self-control, Bataille ecstasy
(ek-stasis). Another way of putting this is that Bataille, unlike de Sade—and unlike
Kant—is  concerned  precisely  with  that  “feeling”  that  Kant  and  de  Sade  try  to
render irrelevant to action in the name of apriority—the proper subject of Bataille’s
enquiry hence becomes l’expérience intérieure, that paradox which both galvanises
and undermines much of Bataille’s thinking. It galvanises it by preparing the terrain
for  an  enquiry  into  pure  subjectivity,  which  in  turn  makes  possible  the
thematisation of excess. Eroticism, religion, sovereignty, all search for continuous
—that  is,  immanent—being.  Yet  this  desire  is  precisely  what  theologies,
anthropologies and so forth, leave out. Mauss’ explanations, Bataille believes, “do
not  say  what  brings  men  to  kill  their  fellows  religiously”2.  It  is  in  analysing
sacrifice qua spectacle, not  qua structure, that we should discover this truth—and
the  spectacle  conceived  not  formally,  but  experientially.  Yet  it  undermines  the
thinking as well in exposing it to the minefield of philosophical solipsism. This
brings about a need to negotiate between the excesses of heterology on the one
hand and immanence on the other. Whence the conception of communication as
contagion; whence the role of eroticism as aporia to any sublative dialectic.
But I digress. If Bataille diverges from de Sade with respect to the synthetic
apriority of crime, they are at one on transgression itself. And this is where Kant
1
 G. Bataille, Eroticism, trans. Mary Dalwood, London, Penguin, 2001, p. 173.
2
 OC VII, p. 264. My translation.
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comes in. In one of Kant’s wittiest passages (and Christ knows there aren’t many),
he asks us 
Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and
opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passion if,
in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected on
which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not
have to guess very long what his answer would be.
Here, Kant wishes us to intuit, the man is applying means-end rationality. On the
one hand, get laid, on the other, get hanged by the neck until dead. “But”, Kant
continues:
ask him whether he thinks it would be possible for him to overcome his love of
life, however great it may be, if his sovereign threatened him with the same
sudden death unless he made a false deposition against  an honourable man
whom the ruler wished to destroy under a plausible pretext. Whether he would
or not he perhaps will not venture to say; but that it would be possible for him
he would certainly admit without hesitation.1
Kant’s  point  regards  the  choice  at  work  here:  whether  we choose to give  false
deposition or not, the thinking at work is irreducible to means-ends calculation. In
this, we recognise the existence of a different conception of causality that we can
follow. The moral law isn’t this law of freedom, rather it is the way in which such
freedom—sovereignty—is glimpsed, its ratio cognoscendi.
Now, there is an assumption underlying this argument that Bataille would
find  absurd.  Kant  assumes  that  all  desire  is  intentional—that  is,  each  desire
corresponds to an object desired, and hence, fulfilling desire requires instrumental
thinking.  The  point  of  interior  experience  is  precisely  that  this  experience
constitutes  its  own  object—as  such,  it  has  no  object  at  all  on  the  Kantian
understanding  of  it.  However,  at  the level  of  epistemic structure,  the two are a
perfect fit. Both see the understanding as subsumptive, and both see sovereignty as
anti-instrumentalist.  “[M]an’s  intelligence”,  says  Bataille  in  “Hegel,  Death,  and
Sacrifice”, “his discursive thought, developed as functions of servile labour”. For
Bataille, this labour is not merely physical, but intellectual. He continues: “Only
sacred,  poetic words,  limited  to the  level  of  impotent  beauty,  have retained the
1
 I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1997, p. 30.
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power to manifest full sovereignty”1. Here I’d like to note two things. Firstly, that it
is language—sacred, poetic words—that allows man to be sovereign. For Kant, we
also  express  sovereignty  through  a  particular  linguistic  form,  the  categorical
imperative.  Secondly,  sovereignty  coincides  with  impotence.  This  arises  from
asserting  the  incompatibility  of  determinism  and  freedom,  even  if  that  means
embracing impotence. This impotence becomes, as it were, the condition for the
possibility of freedom itself. The free man in Kant’s example above is unable to
escape his fate (either the noose or betraying an honest man)—it is only by virtue
of this inability that he can truly, and for the first time, be free.
Sovereignty,  for  Kant  and  Bataille  alike,  entails  the  rejection  of
instrumentalism,  be  it  in  moral  and  political  utilitarianism  or  in  subsumptive
reason.  It  also  entails  living  as  though  not  subject  to  the  laws  of  nature
(impossibility as transcendental condition of the possible as such). But this does not
bring in a nomological free-for-all, as both install a new system of rules in place of
the old one. The narrator of Story of the Eye, when saying “I cared only for what is
classified as ‘dirty’”, adds immediately that this is not “the usual debauchery”2. Or
we can look in his theory of eroticism, where Bataille discusses how the taboo is
structured through a series of transgressions—the taboo being a legality asymptotic
to laws of nature. Sexual transgression and moral duty are both based on the prior
epistemological conflict between freedom and nature, and, to the extent that man is
necessarily implicated in the laws of nature, between man and his own body. 
And so, let us ask—what about the body itself? Charles Péguy once said of
Kant, wonderfully: he has pure hands, but he has no hands. Bataille and Kant share
an epistemic squeamishness in the face of the human body as natural thing. Kant’s
response to this squeamishness is to glimpse the noumenal; Bataille’s is to fetishize
the abject, but it is the same squeamishness.
1
 G. Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice”,  A Bataille Reader, ed. by F. Botting and S. Wilson,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, p. 291.
2
 Story of the Eye, op.cit., p. 42.
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In my introduction, I stated that Simone’s cunt is the sacrificial circle. Now
comes the time to make good that claim. When Don Aminado’s eye has been cut
from its socket and inserted up Simone’s cunt, the narrator says: “I even felt as if
my eyes were exiting my head, erectile with horror; in Simone’s hairy vagina, I saw
the pale blue eye of Marcelle, gazing at me through tears of urine”1. This moment
brings back to life the moment when Simone pisses on dead Marcelle’s eyes, eyes
that refused to close. In this sacrificial circle, a priest’s eye becomes a young girl’s.
What is significant is that it is not that the narrator sees the priest’s eye and then
associates it  with Marcelle’s. Rather,  it  is Marcelle’s eye he  sees.  The “tears of
urine” mark the merging of these two liquids into one, and, of course, it is living
eyes  that  can cry.  Bataille’s  symbolism is  the  perfect  example  of  one’s  having
one’s cake and eating it. 
I have been saying it is Simone’s cunt, but the word in question is “cul”.
This word normally means “arse”, but Bataille has insisted otherwise from the first
page, where he says that “cul” “is the loveliest of the words for vagina”2. For the
passage under discussion3 this  means that,  at one and the same time, Simone is
being  penetrated  by  the  narrator  and  has  the  eye  inserted  up  her.  Both  are
penetrating her “cul”. Yet we will later have it specified that the eye ends up “in
Simone’s hairy vagina”. For a translator, there remain two possibilities.
1-that the eye is in the vagina (cul) and the narrator’s cock up her arse (cul)
2-that both eye and cock penetrate her vagina (cul).
In fact,  the Neugroschal  translation decides that the eye is inserted up her arse,
presumably to make space for the cock in her cunt. Yet the logistics involved here
(especially to  re-place  Marcelle’s  eye  “in  Simone’s  hairy vagina”)  seem overly
complicated. Indeed, such logistics are unlikely to have worried Bataille—he was
many things—eroticist, novelist, philosopher, anthropologist—but gynaecologist he
was not. For the time being let us note in that the indeterminacy and epistemic
1
 Story of the Eye, op. cit., p. 67.
2
 Ibid., p. 9.
3
 Ibid., p. 66-67.
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blockage correspond to the two essential moments of the Kantian sublime, and that
here the semantic indeterminacy serves to develop the continuity of being that we
already came across in the immanent symbolism of Simone’s cunt. And let us not
forget that the analytic of the sublime in nature holds a peculiar place within Kant’s
oeuvre, as the only time that he attempts a speculative analysis (which, in the terms
of  the  architectonic,  should  really  be  a  contradiction  in  terms).  Moreover,  this
speculative moment becomes possible by virtue of the impossibility of determinate
cognition, an impossibility that arises in the epistemic refusal of the sublime object
to  the  human  representational  faculties.  In  these  sacred,  poetic  words  (or  this
particular sacred, poetic word), things lose their definition, and return to their lost
immanence. It is neither vagina nor cunt nor arse that forms the sacrificial circle; it
is the word “cul” itself.
It is significant that, in the passage cited, the immanence noted occurs not
only in Simone’s cunt, but also in the eyes of the narrator (the gaze that returns all
these  other  dead-eyed  gazes).  As  Bataille  notes,  sacrifice  attains  its  power  not
merely through its symbolism, but in its status as spectacle. The spectators in the
sacrifice  do  not  simply  see  the  slaughtered  animal,  they  become  it,  and  hence
become the god. The division of the in-dividual is what defines the transgression.
When the narrator meets Marcelle’s and Don Aminando’s eyes with his own, they
become “erectile”, they bulge just as his cock does at the same time. Drawn into the
spectacle of immanence occurring in Simone’s cunt, his eyes become a part of that
immanence, indeed, make the immanence possible. This is, of course, not the only
time that  spectator  and spectacle become one—Granero’s  death being a case in
point.  In such scenes,  Bataille  aims to resolve (or,  better  perhaps,  dissolve) the
contradictions that will lead him later in his life to l’expérience intérieure.
Sacrifice only brings continuity of being through the animal’s death, and we
can’t forget that the eye in Simone’s cunt is a dead eye, tears or no tears. That sex
and  death  are  so  intertwined  in  Story  of  the  Eye is  hardly  surprising.  On  the
strikingly few occasions  that  Simone  and the  narrator  actually have penetrative
intercourse,  death is  always present,  either in the literal  company of Marcelle’s
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body, Don Aminado, the slaughtered bull and so forth, or—and more striking—
through  the  symbolism  of  infertility  that  accompanies  their  various  sex  acts,
penetrative or otherwise. 
Reproduction,  Bataille  holds,  makes  death  possible.  Sovereignty,  on  the
other hand, is the refusal to live according to the laws of nature. It is unsurprising,
then, that sovereign eroticism will be non-reproductive, infertile eroticism. As we
saw, sovereignty is impotent, infertility enters language as its principle. Take the
young lovers’ first sexual encounter, for example. Standing opposite each other, in
a state of unbearable arousal,  their first instinct  isn’t to make love—or fuck, or
whatever.  Rather,  they  stand,  watching  one  another,  wanking,  “Without  even
touching one another”1. Once again, the philosopher opts for the contemplative life.
In the second, Simone mounts the narrator—but to wank off on his belly, not to
fuck. This fake-sex symbolism is pushed further when the narrator says: “I thrust
my finger, lubricated with my young come, into her cunt”2. The finger takes the
place of the cock not only in penetrating Simone, but also as the repository of his
sperm.  The next  act—he tries to piss  into her  cunt—is once more a performed
simulacrum  of  fertilization.  Urine  will,  as  we  saw  with  Marcelle’s  weeping,
become a significant bodily fluid. Here, it metamorphoses into sperm, another hint
at its own infertility.
This  first  encounter  is  provoked  by Simone’s  sitting in  a  saucer  of cat’s
milk, the first of many dairy products to grace the story. That dairy products are so
central to Bataille’s erotic encounters in unsurprising: eggs are unfertilised chicken
ova, milk is used for rearing calves. Taking them out of consumption and into an
alternative, erotic economy constitutes a very Bataillean sovereignty. Again fertility
is key, so that when Simone breaks raw eggs in her cunt and watches the runny
yolk drip down her thighs, it does so in stark contrast to her own ovum, yet another
infertile simulacrum of Simone’s fertility. 
1
 Ibid., p. 10.
2
 Ibid., p. 11.
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Now, this symbolism of infertility,  I  would like to suggest,  is not merely
about Simone’s cunt. Rather, it tells of the relation between Simone and the text as
a whole. In his Theory of Religion, Bataille argues that “When the animal offered
enters into the circle where the priest will immolate it, it passes out of the world of
things to a world that is immanent to man, intimate, known as is woman in sexual
consummation”1.  But  how  intimate is  Simone  to  the  men  around  her—Bataille
included? In what way is she known—in and out of sexual consummation?
To see this, let us turn to the novel’s  dénouement, in the “church of Don
Juan”2. Here, as elsewhere, we only know about her interiority what the narrator
interprets,  and yet  come to  know the insufficiency of  the very structure  of  the
narrator’s  interpretations.  This  epistemic  movement  is  inaugurated  when,  as
Simone  laughs  uncontrollably,  Sir  Edmond  cries  “Can’t  you  explain?”  They
assume the object of her mirth is something in the church, and so “look […] in vain
for  the  comical  sight  that  the  girl  had  been  unable  to  explain”.  Here  the
interpretation is utterly wrong in all respects. There is no sight that is comical, nor
was  the  girl  unable to  explain.  The  interpretation  didn’t  even  know  what  to
interpret.  All  that  Simone  will  say  in  response  to  their  questioning  is:  “you’ll
understand”.  Simone often tells  the narrator “you’ll  understand” when he’s at  a
loss, as though to draw out the enigma. For example, when, in the bullring, Simone
won’t  sit  down because she  wants  to  sit  on the  balls  on the  plate  (yet  another
infertile simulacrum), but can’t because of all the people watching, she tells this to
the narrator by saying: “don’t you understand that I want to sit on the plate?”3 The
narrator says that “I stared at her to let her know that I understood”—but, at the
same time, gives the reader no indication that he does. That he should need to stress
that he does, in fact, suggests the very opposite. 
Back to the confessional scene. After Simone says “you’ll understand”, the
narrator continues: “That was why I patiently waited for the key to the puzzle”. In
French, the “key” to the puzzle is le mot de l’enigme. But it is precisely words that
1
 G. Bataille, Théorie de la religion, OC VII, op. cit., p. 59 (my translation).
2
 Story of the Eye, op. cit., p. 55 ff.
3
 Ibid. p. 52.
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have been problematised. The continual address to the reader of phrases like “you
can imagine”, “evidently” and “of course”—in French,  bien entendu, which has a
further connotation of agreement and understanding you don’t get in translation—
acts as an insistence on text and reader understanding one another intuitively. The
narrator tells us at the beginning of the novel “I realized that [Simone’s] feelings at
seeing me were the same as mine at seeing her, but found it difficult to talk about
it”.  And  to  invoke  intuitive  understanding  here  is  effectively  to  give  up  on
language.
Whilst he may understand how Simone feels at the beginning, by the end she
has become quite radically other, addressing her companions almost exclusively in
imperatives  and closed statements.  This  radical  otherness  reaches a head in  the
following dialogue:
“Do you see the eye?” she asked me.
“Well?”
“It’s an egg”, she concluded in all simplicity.
“All right”, I urged her, extremely disturbed, “what are you getting at?”1
She “concludes”, and does so “in all simplicity”, and yet there is nothing simple,
nothing conclusive even, about this conclusion—not even a hint of the thinking that
leads to this conclusion. Indeed, to say it is a conclusion at all, that is, to assume
that there has been a determinate thought process, is already an interpretation of her
behaviour whose validity is at best questionable.  Whence the despairing tone of
“what  are  you  getting  at?”  and  Simone’s  sheer  refusal  to  proffer  any  kind  of
answer.
This passage echoes another, in which Simone describes how the eye is egg-
shaped, and then plays with the assonance of eye and egg (les yeux, les œufs). Here
the narrator says that “her arguments became more and more unreasonable”2. Once
again, the implicit normativity of what is “reasonable” is key. Compare this to Sir
Edmond’s account of transubstantiation, where the wine isn’t Christ’s blood but his
sperm, to which the narrator remarks: “The lucidity of this logic was so convincing
that Simone and I required no further explanation”3.
1
 Ibid. p. 65-66.
2
 Ibid., p. 34.
3
 Ibid., p. 61-62.
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This is how Simone is known outside of sexual consummation. The onus on
eroticism,  and  on  communication  as  contagion,  is  deployed  as  a  means  of
reconciling this heterology (to invoke another of Bataille’s terms). But this too is
exposed  as  insufficient.  As  the  narrator  sits  next  to  Simone,  awaiting  her  next
“conclusion” outside the confessional, he says: “all I could do was caress her neck,
the line of her hair,  or her shoulder with my cock”4.  This caressing, then, is an
attempt to breach the epistemic gap between them at this moment. “And this”, he
continues,  “put  her  so  much on edge  that  she  told  me to  tuck  my penis  away
immediately or she would rub it until I came”. Now, this “on edge” looks, on first
blush,  as though she’s aroused.  Yet,  it  could also be taken to mean that  she is
irritated:  indeed,  the  original  French  “énervée”  plays  quite  specifically  on  this
polysemy. When the narrator tries to guess her psychological state, his choice of
words leaves the interpretation pointedly indeterminate. It is not for nothing that the
last sex acts described between the narrator and Simone have him rape her. Strange
dualism: he is fucking not her, but her cunt; Simone herself remains ungraspable.
Simone, then, presents an epistemic challenge, not only to the narrator, but
to  the  text  itself.  Furthermore,  she  provokes  a  profound  crisis  in  Bataille’s
metaphysics  (for  Bataille  is,  after  all,  a  metaphysician—whence  his  uncanny
power), that is, she opens up the galvanising contradiction latent in the notion that
Bataille  will,  ten  years  later,  articulate  as  “interior  experience”.  At  once,  the
embrace of methodological solipsism and the most radically ekstatic heterology—
leaving the other non-thematised, never transforming it into what Levinas identifies
in  dialectics  as  “the  Other  of  the  Same”.  Bataille’s  position  is  to  attempt  to
overcome this otherness, rather, through the contagion, and it is in this respect that
eroticism  attains  its  philosophical  significance.  But  in  Story  of  the  Eye,  this
contagion occurs not  as immanence but as failure,  as lack.  Simone,  as other, is
dismembered into a series of fetishised body parts. This, I have argued, is made
possible from the beginning by Bataille’s Kantian conception of sovereignty. The
immanence she offers, then, through her cunt, is only made possible by its being
4
 Ibid., p. 57.
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ruptured  from her  body.  Simone’s  cunt  may  be  the  sacrificial  circle,  but  it  is
Simone herself who gets sacrificed. 
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